

(1) Export controls are a part of a comprehensive response to national security threats. The export of a United States commodity or technology should be restricted in cases in which the export of the commodity or technology would increase the threat to the national security of the United States or would be contrary to the nonproliferation goals or foreign policy interests of the United States.

(2) The export of certain commodities and technology may adversely affect the national security and foreign policy of the United States by making a significant contribution to the military potential of countries or by enhancing the capability of countries to design, develop, test, produce, stockpile, or use weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems, and other significant military capabilities. Therefore, the administration of export controls should emphasize the control of these exports.

(3) The acquisition of sensitive commodities and technologies by those countries and end users whose actions or policies run counter to United States national security or foreign policy interests may enhance the military capabilities of those countries, particularly their ability to design, develop, test, produce, stockpile, use, and deliver nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile delivery systems, and other significant military capabilities. This enhancement threatens the security of the United States and its allies. The availability to countries and end users of items that contribute to military capabilities or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a fundamental concern of the United States and should be eliminated through deterrence, negotiations, and other appropriate means whenever possible.

(4) The national security of the United States depends not only on wise foreign policies and a strong defense, but also a vibrant national economy. To be truly effective, export controls should be applied uniformly by all suppliers.

(5) On November 8, 1995, the President continued the national emergency declared in Executive Order No. 12938

of November 14, 1994, "with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means of delivering such weapons".

(6) A successor regime to COCOM (the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) has not been established. Currently, each nation is determining independently

which dual-use military items, if any, will be controlled for export.

(7) The United States should play a leading role in promoting transparency and responsibility with regard to the transfers

of sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress that—

(8) establishing an international export control regime, empowered to control exports of dual-use technology, is critically important and should be a top priority for the United States; and

(9) the United States should strongly encourage its allies and other friendly countries to—